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Foundation.1. Introduction
The fear that unilateral environmental regulation has a negative impact on international
competitiveness has been a matter of public debate quite frequently. However, in order
to make this discussion meaningful a definition of international competitiveness is
needed, something which is usually missing in the public debate. The public debate in
Germany indicates that many people think of a high trade surplus as an indicator for
high international competitiveness. However, from an economic perspective this
indicator does not seem to be very convincing. There is no reason to believe that
welfare increases if an economy does not consume all its production, but gives part of
it away. An economy produces only more than it consumes, if it has to pay debt and
interest. Therefore, if an economy has a trade balance surplus this only implies that in
the past the economy had a trade balance deficit. If the economy does not have neither
positive nor negative debts, in equilibrium the economy will have always have equal
values of export and import.
Others think that foreign direct investment is a good indicator. If the foreign direct
investment in the domestic country is low or if domestic capital owners prefer to invest
abroad this indicates low international competitiveness. Thus, the task of this paper is
to see which impacts unilateral environmental policy has on foreign direct investment.
Another definition is used quite frequently by economists:
1 Competitiveness [...] is
defined as the degree to which a nation, under free and fair market conditions,
produces goods and services that meet the test of international markets while
simultaneously maintaining and expanding real incomes of its citizens." The postulai i
of ..maintaining and expanding real incomes" implies a situation without a continued
decline in the terms of trade and domestic factor prices. ,,Free and fair market
conditions" imply that changes in the trade position of a country as a consequence of
1 See Tyson (1988), Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, Stavins (1995). The quotation is taken from Tyson
(1988), p. 97.
3trade policy measures are not attributed as changes in international competitiveness.
As will be shown below, situations exist in which environmental regulation might be
used as trade policy. This typically takes place if the economy under consideration can
influence its terms of trades. According to this definition of international
competitiveness the impacts of environmental regulation must be separated into the
effects that are caused by direct changes in the environmental regulation and the
indirect effects that change the trade flows as a consequence of new equilibrium terms
of trade.
2
This paper analyzes the effects of a unilateral environmental regulation under perfect
competition and international trade. The rest of this paper is analyzed as follows: The
first section analyzes the impact of unilateral environmental regulation on welfare and
on various indicators of international competitiveness under the assumption that capital
internationally immobile in a small and large open economy. The next section extends
the analysis to include international capital mobility also in a small open and large
open economy framework. The last section concludes.
2. Environmental Regulation in a Heckscher-Ohlin Framework
The analysis of this paper neglects distortions resulting from taxation or trade barriers
completely. The only distortion that is allowed results from a negative externality in
production. The model is a standard two commodity Hekscher-Ohlin trade model. Two
variations are considered: The first version considers a small open economy that faces
exogenous terms of trade. The second version considers a large economy that can
influence its terms of trade.
3 The production sector uses pollution as an input factor
which creates a negative externality in the household sector which has a preference for
environmental quality. Two possible ways of modeling pollution can be identified.
2 See Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, Stavins (1995) for this opinion.
3 The small open economy version of this model follows essentially Copeland (1994).Pollution can be a private good. In this case the economy faces an endowment
constraint for the factor pollution. Efficiency arguments in the production sector
usually lead to full use of pollution. In this sense pollution is usually interpreted as an
indicator for the endowment of environment of the economy and the supply of the
factor pollution is completely inelastic. Even if the government taxes the use o
F
pollution this will not change the amount of pollution applied in production, because
the production sector is able to shift the burden of any price change fully to the
suppliers of pollution. Therefore, any tax on pollution will be completely offset by
changes in the market price for pollution. The only way how the government can
influence the amount of pollution used in production is to limit the supplied quantity of
pollution. De facto this tantamount to reducing the endowment constraint of the
economy.
The other way how one might think about pollution is to understand pollution as a
public bad. Pollution is not really an input into production, but rather a joint output of
production. Understood in this way the production sector produces consumption goods
and a joint output pollution. The economy does not face any endowment restriction,
but the level of environmental quality is determined by the joint product. How much
the firms produce of the joint output pollution depends on the prices they face. The
environmental policy instrument is now the emission tax. The emission tax in
combination with other factor prices determines the pollution output of firms.
In this paper both ways of modeling pollution, namely the private good and the public
good case, are considered. Also considered is international factor mobility. As is well
known, the choice of dimensionality of trade models influences the equilibrium.
4
Therefore it is not possible to simply extend a two commodity two factor trade model
for factor mobility. The equilibria of these two models would not be comparable,
standard theorems of trade theory would be valid in the one version of the model but
not in the other. Therefore, an extension of a trade model for international factor
4 See Ethier (1984) and Ethier, Svensson (1986).mobility would also require an adjustment of the dimensionality in order to keep the
equilibria of both variants comparable. In the approach chosen here an extension to
include international factor mobility is straightforward. Therefore, after discussing the
basic model with international immobility an extension is considered with perfect
international capital mobility.
5
2.1. The Behavior of the Production Sector
The economy is assumed to consist of 2 sectors. Each sector faces perfect competition
in the factor and output market and its firms maximize profits Yl[. Each sector
produces one output good, Yj, with the factors labor, Lj, capital, Kj, and emissions
Pj, where i = 1;2. The output goods are both internationally tradable and can be sold at
world market prices p[, where pi is assumed to be the numeraire. Labor, capital and
environment are mobile between sectors but immobile internationally. The factor
prices are denoted WL, wj^, and wp, respectively.
Since there are no externalities between sectors individual profit maximization under
perfectly competitive conditions implies that firms behave as if they were maximizing
total profits of the production sector. It is assumed that the supply of labor and capital
is inelastic, such that it can always be denoted with L, and K, respectively. Pollution
P is a by-product of production for which the production sector has to pay a price wp
to the government. The price for pollution, wp, is a policy instrument for the
government.
Next, this section gives a heuristic derivation of the national product function which
has become an important tool in modern trade theory.
6 Under the assumption that there
are no externalities between firms in the production sector, individual profit
5 Examples for this extension may be found in Woodland (1982) and Ethier, Svensson (1986).
6 Other introductions into the concept of national product functions are given in Dixit, Norman
(1980), or Woodland (1982).maximization is equivalent to joint profit maximization. Since under the assumption of
constant returns to scale profits for each firm are zero, the behavior of the firms of the
economy can be summarized by the following maximization problem:
= max
where n denotes the number of firms. The market equilibrium requires that factor
demand equals factor supply. This condition can be considered as follows:
n [ n
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The conditions for the factor market equilibrium allows the following rearrangement of
the above function:
^K = G(p;wp;K;L) =
max XpiYi-wPPi:Yi<Fi(Li;Ki;Pi);L=|;Li;K=XKi: | = o'
Li;
Ki;
pi[i=i i=i i=i J
where for p we adopt vector notation such that p denotes the vector consisting of pj
and p2- The technological and endowment constraints of the above maximization
problem is usually summarized by the notation (Y,P)GT(K,L), where T(K,L) is
called the technology set and Y denotes a vector consisting of Yj, Y2. The variable P
denotes the sum of Pj and P2. The resulting function can now be summarized as
follows in the so called national product function:
7
(1) G(p,wP,K,L) = max{pY-wPP:(Y,P)eT(K,L)}.
7 See Dixit, Norman (1980), or Woodland (1982) for mathematically precise descriptions of the
national product function. The approach of this section attempts to be a constructive and intuitive
derivation of the national product function.The convenience of national product function results from application of the envelope
theorem that delivers all the endogenous variables needed to obtain comparative static
results. Differentiation of the national product function with respect to the prices p\,
P2 delivers the outputs Y\, Y2, respectively. Differentiation with respect to the factor
endowments yields the respective factor prices. Differentiation with respect to wp
delivers -P. It is well known that G(p,wp,K,L) is concave in K and L and convex
in p, and wp.
The national product function G(p,wp,K,L) also includes the public good character
of pollution. If pollution were a private good, as is assumed often in the literature
8, the
national product function requires the inclusion of a factor endowment constraint for
pollution P. The national product function is now:
(2) G(p,P,K,E) = max{pY:Yef(P,K,L)},
where T(P, K, L) is a strictly convex technology set.
The difference in the assumption about rivalry in the use of pollution, changes also
environmental policy instruments. In the public good model environmental policy
consists in changing the price for pollution, wp, which is exogenous. Firms then
change their production inputs and the endogenous variable P changes as a result.
In the pollution as a private good model, the optimum conditions of the production
sector require that all of the endowment of P is used for production. The only way
how government policy can change the level of pollution is by changing the
endowment of the economy. This means the environmental policy instrument is the
exogenous variable P. The derivation of G(p,P,K,L) with respect to P delivers the
now endogenous price for using pollution in production, wp. For the rest of this paper
See e.g. Eichberger, Gronych, Pethig, Siebert (1980), Rauscher (1997).pollution is considered as a public good. A change in this assumption is
straightforward.
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Very important for the comparative statics in Heckscher-Ohlin Trade models are the so
called Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson theorems.
1
0 The Rybczynski theorem gives
comparative static results for the reaction of output after the factor endowment of the
economy has changed under the assumptions of constant product prices. With the
national product function these reactions are found very easily. The output for each
sector is found after differentiating the national product function with respect to the
output prices. In the pollution as public good case we have:
Yi=Gp.(p,wp,K,L), i = l;2.
In the pollution as private good case we have:
Yi=Gp.(p,P,K,L), i = l;2.
Differentiation of the output with respect to the factor endowment gives the desired
reactions of output to an increase in the factor endowment. The Rybczynski theorem
states that the output of sector i increases if this sector uses the factor whose
endowment is increased relatively intensively to other sectors. We use this theorem as
a definition for factor intensity. Consider for example a change in the endowment of
labor, L. Sector i is labor intensive, if the derivative G [(p,wp,K,L), or
G [(p,P,K,L), respectively, is positive. These derivatives are the so-called
Rybczynski derivatives. If this derivative is negative, sector i is labor extensive.
9 If environment is considered as a private good the dimensionality of the model would have to be
changed such that the number of goods equals the number of private production factors, i.e. a third
production sector would be needed. This extension generates an equilibrium that would yield the
validity of the classic theorems of trade theory. See Ethier (1984) or Jones (1987) and also the
appendix to this paper for details.
1
0 Stolper, Samuelson (1941) and Rybczynski (1955) were the first to analyze the effects of product
prices and endowment on factor prices and output, respectively.The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says how factor prices react to a change in output
prices under the assumption that endowments remain constant. Since factor prices are
found by differentiating the national product function with respect to endowment, the
desired reactions are described by the so called Stolper-Samuelson derivatives and
which are the following second derivatives of the national product function:
Xn (p,wP,K,L), i = l;2, and X = K,L,
dpi
in the pollution as public good case, and
= ^Xn- (P>P>K,L), i = 1;2, and X = K,L,
dpi
 F
l
in the pollution as private good case. One can also see that the Rybczynski and
Stolper-Samuelson derivatives are identical.
1
1
In the environment as a private good case one could define pollution intensive and
extensive sectors in an analogous way as labor intensive and extensive sectors.
However, in the pollution as a public good case this is not so obvious. In this model
the output effects of environmental policy are:
dY; / x dP
(3) —
L = Gp w p,wP,K,L) = -—, i=l,2.
dwp
 K
1
 r dpj
An increase in the price of pollution, wp, will reallocate the capital and labor
endowment of the economy between the two sectors. If the output of sector i increases
after raising wp, the contracting influence of the cost increase is overcompensated by
drawing more of the resources to this sector. This sector is called pollution extensive.
If the reallocation of resources in the economy is not able to compensate the
contracting impact of the increase in the price of pollution the sector is called pollution
intensive.
1
2
1
1 See Dixit, Norman (1980) for the terms Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski derivatives,
respectively.
1
2 This line of argumentation is adopted from Copeland (1994).An alternative intuition for this definition is offered by -dP/dpj. An increase in pj
will increase the output of sector i by drawing more resources away from the rest of
the economy towards the sector i. This will also change the pollution level of the
economy. If the expanding part of the economy increases its pollution more than the
contracting part, the expression dP/dp, is positive. In this case the sector i is called
pollution intensive.
1
3
From these definitions follows that sector i is pollution intensive if in the environment
as a private good case G p(p,P, K,L) is positive and in the environment as public
good case if Gp.Wp (p, wp,K, L) is negative.
The next section introduces the household sector.
2.2. The Behavior of the Household Sector
The economy consists of one household sector. Assuming that all households are
identical in preferences and endowment, die sector is sufficiently described by a
representative household. The representative household maximizes a utility function
which contains the consumption of the two tradable output goods, which are denoted
with C\ and C2 and that are summarized in the vector C. Consumption is financed by
income that is obtained from rental of capital, labor, which is supplied inelastically and
lump sum transfer from the government. The lump sum transfer from the government
is financed by taxation of the production input environment. Thus, the households
receive all factor payments as income. The household behavior is described by the
following minimum expenditure function:
(4) E(u,p;Z) = min{pC:u<U(C;Z(P))}.
1
3 See also here Copeland (1994).The expression Z(P) = P describes the externality from using environment in
production. The smaller the amount of environment used for production the larger the
utility. Hence, U^ <0, and consequently E^ >0. Differentiation of E(u,p;Z) with
respect to the commodity price vector pj yields the compensated demand functions of
the private consumption good i, with i=l,2. If utility is weakly separable between
private consumption and environmental quality, demand for C is independent of
environmental quality. However, in general, this paper assumes that private
consumption and environmental quality are not separable, thus in general Epz *0.
Differentiation of the minimum expenditure function with respect to utility u gives the
additional income that is necessary to obtain the additional utility. It is clear that
Eu>0.
The rest of this paper analyzes the impacts of domestic environmental policies on
welfare and different measures of international competitiveness. The case of
environment as a private good is neglected, since it is very similar to the case of
environment as a public good.
2.3. Environmental Policy in the Small Country Case
This section describes the equilibrium under the assumptions of a small open economy
that takes world market prices as given.
1
4 The effects of environmental policy on
welfare and competitiveness are discussed. Environmental policy consists of increasing
the price for environment wp. The effect on welfare is measured by changes in utility
u. International competitiveness of a sector is measured by its revenue PiYj, i = 1;2.
The equilibrium is described by the following equations:
(5a) E(u,p;Z) = G(p,wp,K,L)-wpGWp,
1
4 A comprehensive treatment of this model is given iii Woodland (1982), Ch. 6 for the case without
environment. For a treatment that includes environmental externalities, but analyzes only welfare
impacts of environmental policies, see Copeland (1994).
12(5b)
where Z = -Gw and M denotes the import of commodity 2. For brevity, the
arguments of differentiated functions are left out. Equation (5a) describes the income
equation of the household. The expenditure for all consumption commodities has to
equal the household income. The household income equals, as previously noted, the
factor payments of the production sector. The tax payments of the firms for pollution
cancel out, since the government gives this tax revenue in a lump sum fashion to the
household sector. Expression (5b) gives a definition of the net import of commodity 2.
The difference between domestic demand and domestic output must equal the import
of the respective commodity. The corresponding equation for commodity 1 is
redundant due to Walras' law. The endogenous variables are utility u, and the net
import of commodity 2, M. Thus, two equations solve two variables.
Environmental policy consists of raising wp. From equation (5a) follows the effect on
welfare of environmental policy after differentiation:
du _ EZ - wP
\°) ~ ~ ~
 UWpWp •
dwp Eu
 v
 v
Welfare u is affected through two channels. Both channels, result from the decrease of
pollution P. The decrease of P reduces the negative externality from production and,
hence, increases welfare, which is expressed by GWpWp Ez/Eu .
1
5 The decrease of P
also reduces the factor income of the households and thus affects welfare negatively.
The change in income results from two sources: First the increase of wp causes a
redistribution of resources from firms to the government. However, since the
households receive all factor income and government tax revenue this effect does not
influence household utility and cancels out. The second source measures the reduction
of factor income due to substitution and contraction of output on the production side.
This is expressed by -GWpWp
 Wp/Eu- If wp is such that pollution is completely
1
5 Due to convexity in prices GWpW is positive.
13internalized, the effect of a marginal increase in wp is zero. This is the case for
wp = Ez which equals the Pigou-tax rate. If wp is smaller (greater) than the Pigou
tax rate, welfare increases (decreases) after an increase in wp.
The rest of this section analyzes the effects of environmental policy on the
international competitiveness of the economy. This requires a definition of
international competitiveness.
In the Heckscher-Ohlin model trade is driven by comparative advantage. In a two
commodity model a country exports commodity 1 if the production is cheaper in terms
of commodity 2. That is, commodity 1 is exported if the domestic country has to
renounce less units of commodity 2 by reallocating resources from sector 2 to sector 1
than the rest of the world. The effects of international competitiveness may then be
measured by their impact on the net import, but holding the terms of trade constant.
1
6
The terms of trade should be held constant, because otherwise one would measure also
the changes in net imports that are brought about solely by a change in terms of trade.
Changes in the terms of trade are already a consequence of changes in the
competitiveness. In the small country model the terms of trade are always constant.
Differentiation of the net import, M gives:
n\
 d
M - F r -r
dwP ~
 p
Z
 WP
WP
 UP
WP-
There are two sources that affect this indicator for international competitiveness. The
tirst source, -EpzGWpWp, describes the effect of improved environmental quality on
demand. An increase in wp reduces pollution and thus increases environmental
quality. If this change in environmental quality affects demand negatively, net imports
will decrease and thus the indicator for competitiveness is affected positively. For
example the demand for tourism, which is an import good, might be affected
negatively, i.e. households stay home, if the environmental quality at home improves.
However, if environmental quality and private consumption goods are weakly
1
6 This definition is used by Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, Stavins (1995). See also Tyson (1988).separable, this effect is always zero. The second source, -Gpw , describes the supply
side effect of domestic environmental regulation. Competitiveness is affected
positively, if the sector is pollution extensive as follows from the above definitions.
Another measure for the international competitiveness of a sector might be its revenue.
For a small open economy which faces exogenous terms of trade, output is an
equivalent measure. The output measure is also an indicator for the market share.
Output can be written as:
Yj =Gp. (p,wp,K,L), wherei=l,2.
It follows from the definition of pollution intensity that an increase in the domestic
environmental regulation increases the output of the pollution extensive sectors and
decreases the output of the pollution intensive sectors.
2.4. Environmental Policy in the Two Country Case
This section describes the equilibrium in a two country case.
1
7 In addition to the
preceding section it is assumed that the public good environmental quality is weakly
separable from the private consumption goods. This amounts to assuming Epz =0.
This seems justified since non-separable preferences for consumption goods and
environmental quality might change comparative static results in either direction.
1
8 The
equilibrium conditions are:
(8a) E(u,p;Z) = G(p,wp,K,L)-wpGWp +Tr,
(8b) E*(u*,p,Z*) = G*(p,wP*,K*,r)-wpGwp -Tr,
(8c) GP2+G;2=EP2+EP2,
1
7 See Dixit, Norman (1980), or Woodland (1982) for a comprehensive treatment of this model
without environmental externalities.
1
8 Besides this, it is a very common assumption in environmental economics.where Z = -GWp and Z* = -Gwp. The equations (8a)-(8c) determine the equilibrium
values of u, u*, and P2- Note that as commodity 1 is the numeraire its price p\ is
normalized. For brevity the arguments of the differentiated functions are left out. The
variable Tr denotes a transfer that the foreign country gives to the domestic country.
This variable is introduced in order to facilitate the comparative statics.
From the differentiation of equilibrium condition (8a) with respect to u, P2, and wp
one can derive the effect of domestic environmental regulation on domestic welfare:
(Q) du _Ez-wPf dp2 "| M dp2
dwp Eu ^
 v
 v
 vvl dwpj Eu dwp
where M = Ep ~Gp_ denotes the import of commodity 2 in the domestic country.
The term in the brackets in expression (9) describes the total reaction of pollution after
an increase in wp. This term takes account of the effect that a change in terms of trade
has on the economy. Under normal circumstances it should be positive, because
otherwise pollution could be decreased by cutting wp.
1
9 However, compared to the
small economy this effect of the terms of trade on pollution affects the magnitude of
the welfare gains from an increase in wp. An increase in the terms of trade implies a
positive effect on welfare if (Ez - wp) and Gw „ are of the same sign. A negative
value of GWpp2 s implies that the pollution in the domestic economy increases after an
increase in terms of trade. This increases the tax base for the lump-sum transfers. The
effect on welfare, however, is positive if the households perceive the increase in the
lump sum transfer as an overcompensation for the increased level of pollution. If
GWpP2 is positive, pollution decreases, and, hence, also the tax basis of the lump-sum
transfer. This has a positive impact on welfare if the households value the decrease in
the pollution higher than the decrease in the lump-sum transfer.
The second term denotes the terms of trade effect. An increase in wp will change the
supply of the domestic production sector. This will in turn affect the terms of trade.
1
9 As the later analysis makes clear the two terms in the brackets are always of opposite sign.
Therefore, on theoretical grounds it cannot be excluded that pollution increases after an increase in
environmental regulation. Rauscher (1997) considers also this possibility.The terms of trade affect domestic welfare through the trade balance. Under the
assumption that environmental regulation increases the terms of trade P2, this channel
tends to affect domestic welfare positively if M is negative, i.e. that the domestic
country is a net exporter of commodity 2. If the domestic country is a net importer of
commodity 2, than the terms of trade have to decrease in order to affect welfare
positively through this channel. The reason for this is that if the home country exports
commodity 2 an increase in the terms of trade means that a given quantity of
commodity 1 can be exchanged for a smaller quantity of commodity 2. If the domestic
country imports commodity 2 it has to give more of commodity 1 in order to receive
the same quantity of commodity 2 after an increase in the terms of trade. In the
Heckscher-Ohlin world a country always exports the commodity where it has a
comparative advantage and imports the commodities where it has a comparative
disadvantage. Thus, one can say that environmental policy tends to affect welfare
positively if it increases the value of the comparative advantage or reduces the value of
the comparative disadvantage.
From the differentiation of equilibrium condition (8b) with respect to u, p2, and wp
one can derive the effect of domestic environmental regulation on foreign welfare:
nn\ du* _Ez-wPr,* dp2 M* dp2
^ -* Z ~ *
 WPP? Z *~Z '
dwp Eu dwP Eu dwP
where M = Ep -Gp2 denotes the net import of commodity 2 of the foreign
country. It is related to the domestic net import of commodity 2 by M + M =0.
Expression (10) describes the effect of a unilateral increase in domestic environmental
regulation on foreign welfare. In the absence of any transboundary pollution this
expression consists only of a terms of trade effect. The interpretation of is analogous to
the interpretation of the terms of trade effect on domestic welfare in equation (9) and
therefore omitted.
We have seen that the effect of environmental regulation on the terms of trade, p, plays
an important role in the determination of the effects of unilateral environmental
17regulation on the welfare in both countries. The sign of the change in terms of trade
results from the interaction of the production technology in both countries and the
preferences of the households, hi order to determine the sign of the terms of trade
effect one can differentiate (8a)-(8c) to obtain the following equation system:
Eu 0 M + (wP-Ez)GWpp2 Vdu
0 Eu M +|wn-E7lGWnn. du
(11)
-E p2u
-E p2u P2P2
-(wP -Ez)GWpWpdwp +dTr
-dTr
where S
p2p2
=(G p2p2 -Ep2p2 +Gp2?2 "Ep2p2
)>0 as a consequence of the
curvature characteristics of the GNP function and the minimum expenditure function.
In order to determine the sign of the determinant Det in (11) we assume that
du/dTr > 0 and du*/dTr < 0.
2
0
dTr~ +Ej2U(wp-Ez)GWpP2].
The signs of the expressions wp -EzJGwpp2 and (wp -Ez)GWpP2 depend on the
environmental policy of the respective country. Especially, it is important how far wp
is away from its Pigou level Ez • We assume that the environmental policy is always
sufficiently close to the optimal level such that the signs of the expressions
(wp -EzJGwpP2 and (wp -Ez)GWpP2 is not decisive for the nominator of (12).
With this assumption the nominator in (12) is positive such that du/dTr > 0 implies
Det > 0.
2
1 Now we can analyze the effects of environmental regulation on the terms of
trade or equivalently the world market price for commodity 2, P2:
2
0 This assumption is a very helpful device in order to facilitate the comparative static analysis
considerably. Similar assumptions are used for example in Dixit, Norman (1980).
2
1 It should be noted that the assumption du/dT > 0 would not be needed under the assumption of
homothetic preferences, which imply Epu=EpU=0. With homothetic preferences the
determinant would be unambiguously positive. Note that the assumption du/dT > 0 is not as(13)
If we maintain the convention that environmental policy is in both countries
sufficiently close to its Pigou level or that preferences are homothetic which implies
Ep u = En u =0. such that the term (wp - Ez) never influences the sign of any of
the multiplicators, the sign of the price reaction is also here determined alone by the
sign of Gp Wp. As it is intuitively clear, with increasing supply of commodity 2,
Gp w > 0, its relative world market price falls, otherwise it increases.
Next the effects of environmental regulation on the various indicators of international
competitiveness are analyzed. The changes in net imports are given by the following
expression:
dp2
dwplP2P2
 UJ
The changes in net imports result from a terms of trade effect that affects the demand
and the supply side and a direct effect of environmental policy. Since the minimum
expenditure function is concave and the national product function is convex in p the
term in the brackets is unambiguously negative. The effect of environmental regulation
on the terms of trade is of the same sign as Gp Wp. Since Gp2Wp is positive
(negative) if the production of commodity 2 is pollution extensive (intensive) thus in
this case net imports of commodity 2 decrease (increase). Equilibrium requires a
balanced trade account, hence, the net import of commodity 1 goes into the opposite
direction. A comparison of the two country model with the small open economy shows
that the sign of net import change are always the same in both models. Consequently,
for this indicator it does not matter if the terms of trade effect is considered or not.
The revenue change in each sector is determined by:
restrictive as it might seem. The transfer docs not affect factor prices. It is straightforward to show
that when du/dT > 0 also du*/dT < 0.
1905)
In (14) and (15) the first term always describes the direct effect of environmental
regulation on the output of the industry. The second term describes the terms of trade
effect. As for the small open economy the first effect is positive or negative depending
whether the industry is pollution extensive or intensive. As was shown above, if
environmental policy in each country is sufficiently close to its Pigou level the terms
of trade are increasing (decreasing) if the domestic industry of commodity 2 is
pollution intensive (extensive). Given that Gp_ +p2Gp2p2 must be positive and that
an increase in the terms of trade implies Gp w to be negative, the sign of (15) is
ambiguous since both terms are always of opposing sign. It cannot be excluded that an
increase in wp is overcompensated by the terms of trade effect. That is, even if the
industry for commodity 2 is pollution intensive (extensive) the revenue of that sector
might still increase (decrease) if the terms of trade effect is strong enough.
Also the sign of (14) may be ambiguous. It is clearly positive (negative) if sector 1 is
pollution extensive (intensive) and, given that Gp p <0, the terms of trade fall
(increase). One can exclude a decrease in terms of trade when sector 1 is pollution
extensive. If sector 1 is pollution extensive this implies that Gp Wp > 0. A decrease in
the terms of trade implies Gp w >0. But since it is impossible that both sectors
increase output after an increase in wp, it is impossible that GplWp and Gp2Wp are
positive at the same time.
At the end of this section another point should be emphasized regarding the incentive
of governments to impose environmental regulation on the economy. Equation (9)
gives the reaction of welfare to an increase in environmental regulation. A government
that wants to maximize domestic welfare should raise wp until du/dwp equals zero.
Therefore, a welfare maximizing government should set wp such that:
20[G +G
The term in the brackets gives the total reaction of pollution after an increase in wp
including the feedback effects induced by the changes of the terms of trade. It is
reasonable to assume that this term is always positive otherwise the government would
reduce pollution by cutting wp. From (16) one can conclude that for a large country it
is in general not optimal to set the price for emission equal to the Pigou level.
M dp 2
Environmental policy should set wp above (below) the Pigou level if
 tjL- is
Eu dwp
M dp 2
negative (positive).
2
2 From the above analysis follows that — is positive
Eu dwp
(negative) if the domestic country imports (exports) the pollution intensive commodity
or exports (imports) the pollution extensive commodity. The reason for this policy
conclusion is that in a large open economy environmental policy has two effects,
namely the effect on the level of pollution, but also the effect on the terms of trade.
Thus, in evaluating environmental policy it is not enough to see whether the
improvement in environmental quality exceeds the change in factor income. Income of
the household changes also as a result of the change in the terms of trade. Therefore, it
might be optimal for a country to do more or less for its environment than traditional
environmental policy analysis suggests. However, since M = -M one can conclude
that if it is optimal for the domestic country to set wp above (below) the Pigou level
then it is optimal for the foreign country to exactly the opposite. Only if there is no
trade between both countries or they cannot influence their terms of trade it is optimal
for both countries to set wp equal to the Pigou level. One can conclude that if it is
optimal for one country to be dirty, i.e. Ez >wp, than there always exists another
country for which it is optimal to be clean, i.e. Ez < wp.
2
3
2
2 This is true under the assumption that an increase in environmental regulation reduces domestic
pollution. The statement revereses if an increase in environmental regulation raises domestic
pollution.
2
3 See Rauscher (1997). This result also follows from Markusen (1975), and Krutilla (1991).
213. Environmental Policy in the Presence of International Capital Mobility
This section extends the analysis of the previous section to include perfect capital
mobility. This extension allows an analysis of the impacts of environmental regulation
on international capital flows. The consideration of international capital flows are
important because in the public debate foreign direct investment is understood as an
indicator of international competitiveness.
This section considers environment only as a public good. Two modifications
compared with the preceding section are necessary. As already mentioned the
dimensionality has to change in order to preserve a minimum of comparability to the
preceding section.
2
4 Thus, the model includes as before two commodities that are
produced and two types of labor, skilled, L$, and unskilled, Ly. The prices for skilled
and unskilled labor are WL$. and WJJJ, respectively. The model requires a
modification with respect to the national product function which has to consider that
capital can be exported. It follows a heuristic derivation: Starting point is the function
G(p.wp,K,L) from the preceding section with one important difference. Capital
endowment. K, is no longer an argument of G(p,wp,K,L). Since capital is
internationally mobile, capital used for domestic production may differ from the
domestic capital endowment, K. Therefore, the equivalent to G(p, wp,K,L) is now:
G(p,wP,K,Ls,Lu) = max{pY-wpP:YGT(K,Ls,Lu)}.
The derivative of G(p,wp,K,Ls,Lij) gives still the rental price for capital w^,
which is, however, not determined any longer, domestically, but on the international
capital market. Thus, an additional equilibrium condition for the production sector
requires:
wK =GK.
2
4 Thisis demonstrated in the appendix, but can be also found in Ethier, Svensson (1986).
22The minimum expenditure function does not change. However, income of the
household is extended for capital income by export. Therefore, the household receives
income from inelastically supplied skilled and unskilled labor, from lump sum
transfers, from renting capital to domestic firms and foreign firms.
The next two sections analyze the effects of environmental policy in the small open
economy and the two country setting. Pollution is always assumed to be a public good
and preferences of households are weakly separable between environmental quality
and consumption.
3.1. Environmental Policy in the Small Country Case
In the presence of international capital mobility, the equilibrium of a small open
economy is described by the following equations:
(17a) E(u,p;Z) = G(p,wp,K,Ls,Lu)-wpGWp +WK(K-K),
(17b) wK =GK,
(17c) M = Ep2-Gp2,
where Z = -Gw . Again, the net import equation for commodity 1 can be omitted.
Equation (17a) describes the income equation of the household. Household
expenditure has to equal household income. Compared to the preceding section a new
source of household income is the income from net capital exports, K - K. Equation
(17b) describes the arbitrage condition which implies that the world rental price of
capital has to equal the domestic marginal productivity of capital. (17c) is the known
definition of net imports. The endogenous variables are welfare u, domestic capital
input K and the net import of commodity 2, M.
23Theyimpact of environmental regulation on domestic welfare can be assessed by
differentiation of equations (17a) and (17b):
du =Ez-wPf~ ~ dK "i
dwP Eu ^ '
wP
wP
+UwP
Kdwpj'
where dK/dwp = -GKW /GKK • Th
e term in the brackets in equation (18) gives the
total reaction of pollution after an increase in wp. This total reaction includes the
effect that the change in domestic capital use has on pollution. In the rest of this paper
we call this effect the capital export effect. Due to the concavity of
G(p,wp,K,L$,Lij) in K it is guaranteed that pollution always decreases when wp
increases, thus the terms in the brackets is always positive. This leads to the same
conclusion as in the preceding section. Environmental regulation increases welfare as
long as wp is below Ez. However, compared to the small country model where
factors are internationally immobile the welfare gain of an increase in wp is larger
when factors are mobile as a comparison between (6) and (18) shows, hi this case
globalization increases the possible welfare gains of environmental policy when
initially the emission tax is below the Pigou solution.
2
5
The reaction of domestic use of capital is described by dK/dwp = -GKW /GKK-
The sign of this expression is completely determined by the derivative GKWP • If it is
positive (negative) the domestic marginal productivity of capital increases after an
increase in wp. If the domestic marginal productivity of capital decreases,
environmental regulation causes capital flight otherwise the domestic country becomes
more attractive for foreign direct investment.
Now- we attempt to say something about the sign of the derivative GKW . The
derivative GKWP is similar to the Stolper-Samuelson derivative, if one interprets
pollution as a joint output and wp its negative price. However the important difference
is that the Stolper-Samuelson derivative considers only a change in the output price of
one sector. But if one allows for the possibility of differential taxation of both sectors,
2
5 This result was obtained before by Copeland (1994).
24the national product function would be G(p,wp ,wp ,K,LS,LTJ). In this case
GKW . i=l,2 gives the Stolper-Samuelson derivative 3wK/3wp. ,
2
6 Since wp. is a
negative price the interpretation differs slightly from the standard interpretation: It is
positive if sector i uses capital extensively and negative otherwise. The derivative
Gj£^ might be interpreted now as the derivative that occurs when both sectors of
the economy experience the same increase in wp, i.e. dwpj = dwp2 :
dwK ^
PPI
Therefore, GKW
 may
 D
e considered as a measure of aggregate capital intensity. If it
is positive the economy as a whole uses capital extensively, otherwise the economy is
considered capital intensive. An increase in wp changes optimal factor input in both
sectors. It is possible that the marginal productivity of capital increases (decreases) in
one (both) sector and decreases in the other sector. If the increase in the marginal
productivity is stronger than the decrease the economy is capital extensive. Therefore,
capital flight occurs if the economy as a whole uses capital intensively, but it is
possible that the economy attracts more capital.
2
7
The other possible indicators for international competitiveness are net imports and
revenue. The impact on net imports is:
d
M p r r r
 d
K
EGG
G
Compared to the small open economy without capital mobility there is one additional
effect to consider which results from the impact of environmental policy on foreign
direct investment. Ceteris paribus, if foreign direct investment increases after raising
2
6 Under the assumption of perfect capital mobility wj£ is exogenous in the small country case.
Therefore, the correct interpretation of Bwjc/dwp. is the ceteris paribus impact of wp. on the
marginal productivity of capital. Thus, dw^/dwp. indicates the sign of the change of capital
exports.
2
7 This result is in contrast to Rauscher (1997).
25wpf the net import decreases if the respective sector uses capital intensively. All other
effects were already discussed in the small country model without capital mobility.
Revenue changes in both sectors are expressed by the following terms:
dYi „ .„ dK
dwp
dK
Also here no genuinely new effects are introduced. Compared to the model with
capital immobility only the capital flow effect is new, but it works in the same way as
in (19).
3.2. Environmental Policy in the Two Country Case
In the presence of international capital mobility, the equilibrium of the two country
model is described by the following equations:
(20a) E(u,p;Z) = G(p,wp,K,LSXu)-WpGWp +WK(K-K),
(20b) E*(u*,p,Z*) = G*(p,wp*,K*)rs>ru)-wpG;p +wK(K*-K*),
(20c) K+K* = K
(20d) wK=GK,
(20e) WK=GK,
(20f) Gp2+G*2 =Ep2 +E*2,
26The only new equation here is (20c) which describes that in equilibrium world capital
supply has to equal world capital demand. The endogenous variables are domestic and
foreign welfare, domestic and foreign capital input, the world market rental price for
capital, and the terms of trade P2-
The impact of domestic environmental regulation on domestic welfare is found after
total differentiation of (20a):
du _Ez-wPf~ ~ dp2 ~ dK
(21)
 dWp"
 E
u
Eu dwp dwp
The term in the brackets of (21) gives the total reaction of pollution after an increase of
wp. This term includes the impact of the terms of trade effect and the capital export
effect on pollution. Also here, capital mobility implies a greater decrease of pollution,
compared to the two country model of the preceding section. A new effect is described
by (K - K)dwK/dwp . This effect work comparable to the terms of trade effect on the
trade balance. If wp increases the world rental price for capital and the economy is a
net capital exporter this effect has a positive impact on welfare, because the domestic
country gets a higher reward for exporting capital. Analogously, if wp decreases the
world rental price for capital the domestic economy is better off if it imports capital,
because they become cheaper. All other effects are known and, thus, the interpretation
is omitted.
The impact of domestic environmental regulation on foreign welfare is found after
total differentiation of (20b):
dwp EJ t
 dwP
Also here the interpretation is analogous to the interpretation of (21), hence, it is
omitted.
27The impact of environmental regulation on the terms of trade and the capital flows is
analyzed under the assumption that preferences in both countries are homothetic, i.e.
o E;
0 0
0 0
0 0
= 0-
[(K-K)G,
(wp-EzpWpK
[(K*-r)G*KK
M + (wP-Ez)GWpP2
-M +(wp-Ez)GWpp2
0
'(Ez - wP)G WpWpdwp + dT
-dT
0
-GKwpdwP
JP2
WP*
JP2P2
( du
du*
dK
I dp )
The change in terms of trade after an increase in domestic environmental regulation is:
dP2 _
 GP2
WP
dwp S, 'P2P2
Also here we find that with homothetic preferences the term of trade increase if the
domestic production of commodity 2 is pollution intensive. This result we also found
in the two country model without capital mobility.
The change in domestic capital use is given by:
dK
dwp
The denominator of the term on the right hand side is always negative due to the
curvature of the minimum expenditure and the national product function. The sign of
the nominator depends on three expressions. First, it is important whether the terms of
trade increase or decrease, Gp2Wp. Second, it is important in which country the
28production of commodity 2 is more capital intensive, (GKp2 -GKp )• Thus, not the
absolute capital intensity matters, but the relative capital intensity. And third, it is
important whether the aggregate economy of the domestic country uses capital rather
extensively or intensively,
If the expressions Gp2Wp and (GKp2 -GKP ) are of opposite sign the situation is
favorable for an increase of domestic capital use or equivalently, for an increase in
foreign direct investment. If the terms of trade increase, that is Gp w is negative,
then the impact on foreign direct investment is positive if the domestic country
produces commodity two more capital intensive than the foreign country. An increase
in the terms of trade raises the marginal productivity of capital in both countries above
the real rental price of capital wj^/P2- Therefore, in both countries capital demand
increases in the first round. However, the demand increase is stronger where sector
two uses capital more intensive.
2
8 Exactly the opposite mechanism takes place, when
the terms of trade decrease. Then foreign direct investment increases if the foreign
sector two uses capital more intensive than the domestic sector two, because, the
marginal productivity of capital falls below the real rental price of capital
The second effect that is important is expressed by GKWP and affects only the
domestic country. This effect captures the direct influence of environmental regulation
on the domestic capital demand. This effect has a positive impact on foreign direct
investment if the economy as a whole uses capital intensively. In this case an increase
in wp has a positive impact on domestic capital demand.
The other indicators for international competitiveness are net imports and revenue of
the sectors: The change in net imports is given by:
d
M fa r \
dP2 r r
 d
K
t^
 G)
G ^
2
8 Also here the result is in contrast to Rauscher (1997).
29If one follows the postulate of some economists
2
9 who want to exclude the terms of
trade effects and the capital flow effects, the sign of the indicators depends only on the
pollution intensity of the domestic sectors and the results are the same as in the model
without capital mobility. Otherwise, a new effect has to be taken into account that
results from the impact of the capital flows on the net import of the consumption
commodities. If foreign direct investment increases after raising wp, the net import
decreases if the respective sector uses capital intensively. The terms of trade effect is
already known and therefore not further interpreted.
Revenue changes in both sectors are expressed by the following terms:
dwp
 F1F
2 dwp
 F
1
 F
 F
1 dwp
dK
P2GP2K
Also here no genuinely new effects are introduced. Compared to the model with
capital immobility only the capital flow effect is new, but it works in the same way as
in (23).
Regarding the optimality of the Pigou solution in a large open economy we can make a
similar point as in the two country model without capital mobility. Optimal
environmental policy requires:
(24)
Under the assumption that an increase of wp reduces pollution, such that the term in
the brackets on the left hand side is positive, over-regulation, Ez<wp, in the
economy is positive if tighter environmental regulation increases the comparative
advantage or reduces the comparative disadvantage. This is the case if the right hand
side of (24) is negative. In other words if the exports (imports) of commodity 2 and the
2
9 See Tyson (1988), Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, Stavins (1995).
30capital exports (imports) become more (less) expensive. If tighter environmental policy
reduces the comparative advantage or increases the comparative disadvantage under-
regulation is optimal. If the effect of environmental policy on terms of trade and the
world market rental rate of capital are opposite in sign it is necessary to see which
effect is more important in terms of household income and is simply evaluated by
checking the sign of the right hand side of (24).
As in the two country model without capital mobility if there is one country that over-
regulates there must be always another country that under-regulates.
4. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to study the impacts of unilateral environmental
regulation of a production sector in a general equilibrium model of international trade.
The focus was on the impacts of environmental regulation on welfare and various
indicators of international competitiveness.
Traditional environmental policy analyses suggest that the first-best solution of
environmental taxes should be set equal to the Pigou solution. In the Pigou solution the
externality creating factor is taxed such that at the margin the tax revenue equals
income equivalent of environmental quality. In a small open economy that faces
exogenous terms of trade this policy is still optimal. However, in a large country that
faces endogenous terms of trade this proposition does not hold any longer in general.
The endogeneity of the terms of trade renders environmental policy as a potential
instrument not only for environmental policy, but also for trade policy. Consequently,
the first-best solution of environmental taxes should consider its influence on the terms
of trade. This leads to the result that compared to the Pigou solution over- or under-
regulation becomes optimal. However, the first-best solution of environmental taxes in
different countries are always complementary. If in one country over-regulation is
31optimal then there always exists a second country for which under-regulation is the
optimal solution.
In the public debate the fear is expressed that unilateral environmental regulation has
negative impacts 'on the international competitiveness. This paper considered three
indicators of international competitiveness: net imports, revenue, which indicated the
market share, and foreign direct investment. Net imports and revenue are sectoral
indicators that have to be calculated for each sector. The impact of international
competitiveness on these indicators was analyzed in a small open economy that faces
exogenous terms of trades and in a large open economy that faces endogenous terms of
trade each with and without international capital mobility.
In the evaluation of the impacts of domestic policy on international competitiveness it
is often argued that the appropriate measure is the identification of the effects holding
world market prices constant. It is argued that otherwise one would measure changes
in competitiveness that are brought about by changes in world market prices and not
the domestic policy. For a small open economy this does not make any difference,
because world market prices are constant, but for a large open economy it does. If one
follows this line of argumentation net imports and revenue are equivalent indicators for
international competitiveness. In all models it was found that the international
competitiveness of a sector increases if it is pollution extensive. The pollution
intensive sectors loose in international competitiveness. Foreign direct investment
increases if the economy as a whole uses capital intensively. Thus, it is not necessarily
true that environmental regulation induces capital flight.
If one considers also the indirect effects of environmental regulation that work through
changes in world market prices on international competitiveness the results obtained
for the large open economy might change. In this case the effects of the terms of trade
and the world market rental price for capital might reverse the results compared to the
case where they were neglected.
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34Appendix Cost functions and equilibrium
Another important tool in modern trade theory is that of cost functions. The cost
functions are helpful in giving the economic intuition behind the results of the
comparative static analysis. Assuming a production function with constant returns to
scale the behavior of each sector can be described by the profit function:
ni(pi;w) = min{PiYi-YiCi(w):Y>0},
where
= min{wVi:Yi=l,(Yi;Vi)eTi},
describes the unit cost function of the production sector i where Vj denotes the vector
of factor coefficients in the production of sector i. In equilibrium with perfect
competition the following conditions must hold when all goods are produced:
Pi=Ci(w), i=l,2.
This condition describes the well known marginal cost pricing condition. For given
world market prices pj, i=l,2, this equilibrium condition determines the factor price
vector w. The factor supply of capital and labor is constrained for each period by the
factor endowment of the economy. The factor demand functions follow from the cost
functions. Thus, the factor market equilibrium is described by:
(25a) C1WL (W)YI + C2WL (w)Y2 = L,
(25b) CiWK (w)Y! + C2WK (w)Y2 = K.
for a given factor price vector w and endowment vector the factor market equilibrium
conditions determine the sector outputs Y\, and Y2.
35Pollution P is a public good that the production sector uses as an input in production.
Thus, its demand is not constrained by endowment or a supply function. The
production sector's demand, however, is finite, because the government charges a
positive price wp for emissions. The demand is, therefore, only regulated by
government intervention. The demand for pollution by firms is described by:
CiWp(w)Y1+C2wp(w)Y2=P.
Now consider the 2 commodity model with capital, labor and pollution as the factors
of production. The equilibrium is described by:
Pi =Ci(wL,wK,wP),
P2 =C2(wL,wK,wP),
CiwL(wL,wK,wp)Yi+C2wL(wL,wK,wp)Y2 = L,
The output prices p\, p2 and the endowment L, K are exogenous. Note that this
system of four equation is partially independent. The first two equations solve the
endogenous factor prices only as functions of the output prices pi, P2- The second
pair of equation solves the endogenous outputs Yj, Y2 only as functions of L, K.
Factor prices depend on output prices and outputs depend on endowment. Therefore,
with identical preferences in all countries export is determined only by the endowment.
In a trade model where p\, P2 are world market prices and wp is the same all over the
world factor price equalization holds.
To obtain these characteristics of the equilibrium dimension is important. For example
if there are three output goods factor prices would depend also on endowment and
output would depend also on prices. Therefore, neither factor price equalization nor
the. Heckscher-Ohlin theorem would not be valid anymore.
36With capital mobility WK becomes a world market price that is determined by trade.
Now the first pair of equation cannot determine the factor prices as functions of output
prices alone. This pair of equations would be overdetermined. Thus, we divide labor
into skilled and unskilled with factor prices WL§, and wjj(j- Then the first two
equations form a system that is exactly determined. The second pair of equations is
now:
where K denotes the domestic demand for capital, which is endogenous for the
domestic production sector. Therefore, if we consider capital mobility, we need to
adjust the dimension of the model in order to preserve the characteristic of the
equilibrium obtained in the version without capital mobility. In general terms, we need
to choose a dimensionality where the number of international markets equals the
number of private factor markets, such that an equilibrium exists where the standard
theorems of trade theory maintain their validity. These theorems are the factor price
equalization-, the Heckscher-Ohlin-, the Rybczynski-, and the Stolper-Samuelson-
theorem.
3
0
The rest of this section analyzes the effects of changes in the world market price vector
p, the price of pollution wp, and the endowment vector W = (L, K) on the output of
the two sectors Y\, Y2, the pollution P and the factor price vector w. In order to
analyze these effects, the rest of this section derives the Stolper-Samuelson derivatives
3wj/3pj, 3wj/8wp , where i = K,L, j=l,2.
3
0 See Ethier (1984) or Jones (1987) for details.
37Given our choice of numbers of goods and factors in the model without capital
mobility, for given product prices and given emission price wp, the factor prices are
determined by:
PI =Ci(wL;wK;wP),
P2 =C2(wL;wK;wP).
Total differentiation leads to the following equation system:
where 9j denotes the share of factor i in the cost of the production of commodity j.
Note that ^0- =1. A variable with a circumflex denotes a relative change. From
i = K,L,P
(26) it is possible to obtain the Stolper-Samuelson derivatives. We are especially
interested in 9WJ /3wp , where i = K,L:
(27)
(28)
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The denominator of (27) is positive if sector 2 is more capital intensive than sector 1, i.
e. K2/L2 > KJ/LJ . This is what the rest of this section assumes. If sector 2 is more
(less) pollution intensive than sector 1, i. e. P2/L2 > Pl/M (P2/L2 < Pl/M) then the
price for capital falls (rises) after an increase of the price for pollution. The change of
the price for labor might be ambiguous. However, if sector 2 is more capital intensive
and sector 1 is more pollution intensive, the price for labor falls unambiguously after
an increase of the price for pollution. If sector 2 is more capital intensive and also
38more pollution intensive, the reaction of the price for labor is ambiguous. The sign of
the reaction of the price for labor depends on:
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The effects of environmental policy on the output of the production sector for given
world market prices are obtained as follows: Differentiating equations (25a) and (25b)
one obtains the following equation system for constant factor endowments:
(29)
Wp
WL
Wp
wK
Wp
wK
Wp
Wp
Wp
s-rj-j +s-TI-J ) denotes the aggregate demand elasticity for factor i with
respect to factor price j. The demand elasticities of the sectors are compensated
demand elasticities that means output is assumed to remain constant. Therefore, from
the definition of the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution follows the following
relationship between this demand elasticity and the elasticity of substitution
Tijj = ajjGj
1. ^
n
e
 variable s] denotes the demand share of sector j on the market for
factor i. The expressions WL/WP and wj^/wp are obtained from (27). From
expression (29) one obtains:
(30a)
(30b)
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The expressions in (30) state that the sign of the reaction of sectoral output with
respect to changes in the price of pollution depend on the sectoral market shares in the
39factor markets, the demand elasticities and the Stolper-Samuelson derivatives.
Regarding the denominator in (30) it is easy to show that it has to be positive under the
assumption that sector 2 is more capital intensive than sector 1.
Expressions (30a) and (30b) can only be opposite in sign if the term in the square
brackets in the nominators of the respective expressions are of the same sign.
If the two sector's factor demand for labor and capital are sufficiently similar in size,
i.e. si ~ si, and s^ = Sjr, then the reactions of sectoral output are always opposite in
sign. Otherwise, it is possible that the reactions of sectoral output are equal or opposite
in sign.
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